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POST-SOVIET ORGANIZED CRIME AND
THE RULE OF LAW
LOUISE SHELLEY*
INTRODUCTION

Post-Soviet organized crime is one of the greatest threats to
human rights, the development of the rule of law, democracy and
free regulated markets in the successor states. The existence of
organized crime on such a pervasive scale undermines incipient
democratic institutions, freedom of the press and the redistribution of private property among the citizenry in an equitable manner.
The authoritarian controls of the Soviet period, which upheld
the Communist Party, may be reintroduced to justify the control
of organized crime. As Russian TV chairman Oleg Poptsov said
following the killing of the prominent journalist Vladislav Listev,
"Nothing changes, but they want to increase the strength of the
militia and the Federal Counterintelligence Service, they want to
have the right to bug, to spy, to compile dossiers on citizens."'
Since mid-1994, presidential, police and military actions
directed against organized crime have resulted in gross violations
of human rights in Russia. President Yeltsin's June decree on
banditism,2 the brutal war in Chechnya,3 the evening assault on
MOST bank in December, 1994 by the presidential guard 4 and
the recently enhanced authority of the Federal Security Service
(FSS),5 the heir of the Russian KGB, have all been justified by
the need to fight organized crime.' The Russian government has
* Professor, Department of Justice, Law and Society of Public Affairs and Professor, School of International Service, The American University. Co-Editor-inChief of DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, journal of post-Soviet democratization.
1. Yeltsin Sacks Moscow MVD Chiefand Prosecutor,OMRI DAILY DIG., Mar. 3,

1995, No. 45, Part 1.
2. The Presidential decree No. 1226, issued on June 14, 1994 was entitled On
the Urgent Measures for the Protection of Citizens of Russia from Banditry and
Other Types of Organized Crime, IZVESTI1A, June 15, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Urgent
Measures].
3. Yeltsin and a member of his Advisory Council have revealed this through

their statements. Otto Latsis, Who Wanted this War, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 11,
1995, at 8.
4. Security Agents Raid MOST Corporation,RFE/RL DAILY REP., Dec. 5, 1994,
at 2 [hereinafter MOST Raid].
5. Hereinafter FSS.
6. CIS Secret Service Chiefs Meet, OMRI DAILY DIG., Mar. 15, 1995, No. 53,
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used the fight against organized crime as a pretext for state repression and the restriction of incipient liberties.
The collapse of communism may not lead to democratization,
the rule of law and the transition to a competitive capitalist
economy. Instead, the pervasiveness of organized crime may lead
to an alternative form of development: political clientelism, controlled markets and a reconstituted security apparatus justified in
terms of the threat of organized crime. Moreover, the power of
regional crime bosses may undermine the rule of law in diverse
regions of the country.
This article focuses primarily on developments in Russia.
However, the conclusions are applicable to many of the successor
states of the former Soviet Union. In almost all of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),7 political corruption undermines the adoption of the legal framework necessary to fight organized crime or establish a legitimate market economy. A return to
state authoritarianism in the name of the fight with organized
crime remains a real threat in many of the successor states. 8
I. THE THREAT OF ORGANIZED CRIME TO THE RULE OF LAW

A. The Scope of Post-Soviet
Organized Crime
Many organized criminals were formerly members of the
nomenklatura, the party elite and are accustomed to using the institutions of state power to protect their political and economic
interests. Therefore, both the organized crime participants and
the manner of protecting organized crime activities represent a
continuity with the past.
The collapse of the Soviet state provided a tremendous impetus for the growth of organized crime. 9 The truly global dimensions of organized crime operations and organized crime's major
role in international money laundering'0 are phenomena that
follow from the collapse of the Soviet state. Post-Soviet organized
crime has proliferated rapidly compared to that of other transnational crime groups." Developments that have taken decades in
other societies have occurred within a few years in the former

Part I.
7. Hereinafter CIS.
8. Leading Kazakh legal officials, in February 1995, and the head of the organized crime committee of the Ukrainian parliament, in March 1995, recognized the
danger of a return to state authoritarianism.
9. See generally, A.I. Dolgova and S.V. D'iakova, Organizovannaiaprestupnost',
2 Moscow: KRIMINOLOGICHESKAIA ASSOTSIATSIIA (1993).

10. E.A. Abramov, 'Griaznye' den'gi i zakon, Moscow: INFRA-M, 1994, at 8-11.
11. See Louise I. Shelley, TransnationalOrganized Crime: An Imminent Threat
to the Nation-State?,48 J. INT'L AFF. 463, 481 (1995).
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Soviet Union. Organized crime groups have simultaneously penetrated illicit and licit markets and become major actors on the
international arena. In most other societies, these are distinct
stages in the development of organized crime. In the former Soviet
Union, the developmental stages have been compressed.
Post-Soviet organized crime exploits the market for illicit
goods and services. These goods and services include prostitution,
gambling, drugs, contract killing, stolen automobiles and supplying cheap illegal labor. 2 Organized crime also engages in the
illegal export of oil and valuable raw materials and the smuggling
of weapons, nuclear materials and human beings.'" Additionally,
organized crime has extorted legitimate businesses and manipulated the privatization process.' 4
Many transnational organized crime groups specialize in a
particular area such as drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling or
weapons smuggling. Post-Soviet organized crime engages in a full
range of illicit activity and has penetrated the emerging licit economy on a large scale. Its entry into legitimate businesses is facilitated by the large scale privatization of the economy that is presently underway. This major economic transformation permits the
laundering of money from its illicit activities into the legitimate
sphere.' 5
B. The Participantsin Post-Soviet
Organized Crime
The participants in post-Soviet organized crime pose a particular danger to the society and the rule of law. These are not individuals outside the power structure, but individuals representing
a continuity from the old Communist power structure to the postSoviet political arrangement.' 6 Once these individuals only had
the use of state property. Now they have appropriated it and can
send the proceeds outside the country.
The unusual coalition of professional criminals, former members of the underground economy, members of the former Party
elite, and the security apparatus defies traditional conceptions of

12. See generally, Leonid I. Fituni, CIS: Organized Crime and Its International
Activities, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND GLOBAL STUDIES, Russian Academy of Sciences, (Wilbad Kreuth 1993).
13. Rensselaer W. Lee, III, The Organized Crime Morass in the Former Soviet
Union, 2 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 392, 392-411 (1994).
14. See generally, Abramov, supra note 10, at 8-11.; Fituni, supra note 12; Lee,
supra note 13, at 392-411.
15. Abramov, supra note 10, at 8-11; Svetlana Glinkina, Privatizatsiya and
Kriminalizatsiya,2 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 385, 385-91 (1994).
16. J. Michael Waller, Organized Crime and the Russian State, 2 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 370, 373-78 (1994).
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organized crime groups, although much of their activity is con-

ducted with the threat of violence. With the exception of the postSoviet narcotics trade, there is no cartel operating within the
former Soviet Union.' 7 Different ethnic groups form loose associations within the former Soviet Union and with compatriots
abroad to market goods and launder money. The associations are
particularly active along the old silk routes where drugs are transported from the Golden Triangle, Pakistan and India. 18 There
are approximately 5,000 organized crime groups, many of them
with only limited numbers.19 Several hundred of these groups
have international ties.
C. Privatization,CapitalFormation and Organized Crime

The large scale privatization of the late Soviet period fueled
the entry of criminal capital into the commercial sector. Privatization invites participation by organized crime due to the need for a
large influx of capital, little of which is held by ordinary citizens.
1. Lack of Legal Framework

In the absence of a capitalist infrastructure, any capital is at
risk. Russia has been slow to develop legal regulations concerning
banking, commodities and stock and voucher funds. This is partially due to the impediments created by organized crime. 20 For
example, the legislation that is developing in this area has been
subject to intense lobbying by the banking sector which is penetrated by organized crime. 21 Furthermore, corrupt politicians
have slowed the adoption of legislation in this area. These politicians either represent organized crime interests or will respond to
its inducements.22 Therefore, organized crime is undermining the
rule of law not only in the areas of justice and human rights, but
also in the commercial sector.
In the absence of a legal framework, the availability of large
scale capital for redistribution can be exploited by both foreign

17. Increased Drug Trade Expected, Antidrug Campaign Urged, F.B.I.S. DAILY
REP., May 29, 1992, at 48-50.
18. Rensselaer Lee & Scott MacDonald, Drugs in the East, FOREIGN POL'Y,

Spring 1993, at 96.
19. The Growth of Organized Crime in the Russian Federation & Its Effect on
Int'l Security, Hearing on Int'l Organized Crime & Its Impact on the U.S., Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Investigationsof the Senate Comm. on Gov't. Affairs, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1994) (statement of First Deputy Minister of Interior Mikhail
Yegorov).
20. Scott Horton & Mikheil Saakashvili, Stage is Set for the Russian Securities

Market, CIS L. NOTES, Feb. 1995, at 3-5.
21. Interview with lawyer for major Russian bank, Nov. 1994.
22. Aleksandr Danilkin, Mafiia-nash rulevoi, TRUD, Dec. 10, 1994, at 6.
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and domestic organized crime groups. Organized crime groups,
with their ready supply of money, are more willing to take risks
than legitimate international businesses which are accountable to
their stockholders and to the government.
2. Banking
Illicit entrepreneurs establish accounts in banks that have
little regulation and do not question the source of badly needed
capital. The possibility of establishing a bank in Russia with very
low capital requirements allows many questionable individuals to
establish banking institutions. Furthermore, confidentiality laws
forbid bankers from disclosing information about accounts to anyone but the tax police,23 a recently established body that is already notoriously corrupt.
Many banks are established and survive because of their
close links with politicians at all political levels.24 The close links
between MOST bank and Moscow's mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, have
permitted MOST to develop into one of the largest banks in Russia."5 Yet this situation is distinctive only because of the major
financial resources that Moscow's mayor can put at the disposal of
his banking associates. The alliances between the banking structures and politicians provide a political and economic clientelism
that severely limits the emergence of democracy and free markets.
Many banks survive by laundering money both for Russians
and citizens of other CIS states who want to move their capital
abroad. However, the banks also provide this service for foreign
organized crime groups. Latin American crime groups appear to
be capitalizing on the absence of banking regulations to launder
their money in Russia.2"
Foreign intelligence and law enforcement bodies investigating
money laundering from the former Soviet Union are disclosing
close links between high ranking government officials and banks
with known organized crime links. Corrupt officials are placing
their rake-offs from lucrative contracts in Russian banks which
then transfer their funds into banks in Europe, Asia, North and
South America, and offshore locations known as havens for money
laundering. The sums involved total in the billions of dollars.
One of the most significant violations of law enforcement
power in the post-Soviet period occurred on the pretext of illicit

23.
24.
25.
125.
26.
1994,
27.

Glinkina, supra note 15, at 390.
Abramov, supra note 10, at 19.
David Remnick, The Tycoon & the Kremlin, NEW YORKER, Feb. 20, 1995, at
Global Mafia Laundering its Money in Russia, RFE/RL DAILY REP., Oct. 27,
at 2.
Abramov, supra note 10, at 10.
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bank misconduct. On December 2, 1994, Yeltsin's private guard,
engaged in an assault on MOST bank.28 This bank is closely
linked with the mayor of Moscow, Luzhkov, who is a political rival
of President Yeltsin.2 9
The alleged reason for the raid of MOST bank, as Korzhakov,
Yeltsin's security chief, subsequently explained to the press, was
to investigate the bank's role in the sharp fall of the ruble in
October 1994 and to obtain documents showing links between
bank board members and corrupt officials in state and municipal
government. 3' The night raid on the bank was conducted by
troops armed with assault rifles and wearing black ski masks.3 1
They assaulted and injured the leader of the bank's security team
and wounded the bank president's driver. 32 The raid was subsequently justified to the press as being in accord with Yeltsin's
decree on combatting organized crime. 33 As the progressive newspaper Izvestiia commented on this abuse of presidential power it
"could bring on a police state."34
3. Trade and Commerce
While banking is a nexus of illegitimate activity, it is only
one of many ways that organized crime enters into illegal activity.
Organized crime uses ancient and new trade routes for the movement of illicit goods. Organized crime exploits the legitimate economy while simultaneously limiting development of certain legitimate forms of investment and open markets that benefit a crosssection of the population. Research by the Russian Academy of
Sciences' Analytical Center indicates that fifty-five percent of joint
stock companies and eighty percent of voting shares were acquired by criminal capital.3 5 Therefore, legitimate investors cannot exercise their rights within these corrupt structures.
The predominance of illicit trade means that the economy
becomes dependent on illegitimate rather than legitimate economic activity. These commodities become central to the state's participation in international markets. This dependence on illegal economic activity is probably the greatest threat to the post-Soviet
economies and citizenry.
The post-Soviet economy is similar to the economies of south-

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

MOST Raid, supra note 4, at 2.
Remnick, supra note 25, at 122.
Id.
Id.
Id.

33. Id.
34. Remnick, supra note 25, at 125.
35. Ninel Kuznetsova, Crime in Russia: Causes and Prevention, 2 DEMOKRATIzATSYIA, 444, 444 (1994).

1995]

Post-Soviet Organized Crime

ern Italy and Colombia which are heavily dependent on their
illicit commerce in drugs. This activity discourages foreign investment and does not allow the economies to diversify. Many citizens
already depend on this illicit commerce for their livelihoods. An
economic system in which organized crime assumes an important
role in banking, commerce and large companies is not any more
accountable to the citizenry than an economy controlled by the
Communist Party. The post-Soviet economic system is a far cry
from publicly held companies that are accountable to their shareholders, the economic model favored by western democracies.
4. Robber Baron Model
The dependency of post-Soviet economies on illicit commerce
is an important distinguishing feature from the American "robber
barons" of early American capitalism to which they are often compared. Except in rare instances, post-Soviet organized crime is not
engaged in production or the development of the infrastructure.
Unlike the industrialists of the nineteenth century who built railroads and factories, post-Soviet organized criminals often drain
the assets of the industries they acquire, depositing their profits
in bank accounts and investing in foreign real estate.
Often, the wealth of the gangster capitalists is not available
to the legitimate economy to employ individuals, update factories
or build new technology. The only exceptions to this are the renovation of real estate in both central Moscow and St. Petersburg
and the large scale housing construction in major urban centers
and along the Volga River.3"
5. Vulnerability of Business Personnel
Even those people who enter into the business world with the
desire to work legitimately often find themselves unable to avoid
compromise with organized crime personnel. They cannot work
within a legal framework or resolve their financial disputes within
established legal structures. Therefore, the protection provided by
organized crime provides a means of protecting businesses and
their persons.
Protection provided by organized crime, rather than by legal
mechanisms, leaves business personnel vulnerable to extortion
threats. Failure to make pay-offs or the existence of rivalries between groups often leads to murder. Large scale businessmen,
aware of their vulnerability, use private bodyguards. However,
this is often insufficient. In Moscow, during the first ten months

36. Interviews with leading MVD personnel and Russian researchers on organized crime (1994).
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of 1994, 2,344 people were murdered. 37 This unusually high homicide rate can be explained by the large number of contract
killings of business personnel. Contract killings are not confined
to the capital but occur throughout the country. One arrested
suspect confessed to killings both in Moscow and in Tyumen, the
West Siberian oil city, 1000 miles from the capital.38 One of the
most recent killings was the assassination of prominent businessman, Oleg Zverev, the head of the Union of Entrepreneurs, in
mid-March 1995. 39 Such killings and assassination threats affect
not only businessmen, but undermine the entire rule of law in
Russia.
D. Organized Crime and State Authority
The rise of organized crime has important implications for
the development of post-Soviet political authority. Organized
crime has undermined the electoral process and the emergence of
a viable multi-party system. Furthermore, organized crime has
perpetuated the endemic corruption of the late-Soviet period.
1. Organized Crime Supplanting the State
Organized crime has supplanted many of the functions of the
state. A coalition of organized crime and former Party elites
serves as the ruling elites of many regions of Russia and many of
the CIS states. Organized crime provides many of the services
that the collapsed social welfare state can no longer provide. Citizens receive services from organized crime that were once furnished by the state-protection of commercial businesses, including
employment for citizens and mediation in disputes. Private security, often run by organized crime, is replacing state law enforcement. Viktor Ilyukhin, the Chair of the Duma Committee on State
Security, estimates that 100,000 private law enforcers presently
operate without any regulation.4 ° While this number is far fewer
than are thought to exist in Poland, it is still a large autonomous
force that is increasingly visible in Russian society.4
Organized crime figures curry favor with the citizenry by
contributing to various philanthropic organizations. They have
also substituted for the state by staffing hundreds of private secu-

37. Duma Debates MVD and Organized Crime, RFE/RL DAILY REP., Nov. 17,
1994, at 1.
38. Pyotr Yudin, DetaineeAdmits to ContractKillings, MOSCOw TIMES, Nov. 15,
1994, at 3.
39. Crime Roundup, OMRI DAILY DIG., Mar. 17, 1995, No. 55, Part 1.
40. Interview with Victor Ilyukhin, Chair of the Duma Committee on State
Security, in Moscow, Russia (July, 1994).
41. Michael Specter, Guns for Hire:PolicingGoes Private in Russia, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 9, 1994, at A4.
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rity organizations which contract with citizens and private businesses.
2. Organized Crime and the Political Process
Organized crime has financed the election of candidates and
members of the newly elected Russian parliament, as well as
those of other CIS states.42 Some current members of the Russian parliament have close ties to organized crime groups. The
gang style killing of two members of parliament, Andrei Aizderdzis and Valentin Martemyanov, has undermined the credibility of
legislators as honest politicians or an alternative political force to
organized crime.4" Moreover, the inability of the state to apprehend their assailants has emphasized the impotence of law enforcement in the face of organized crime.
Corrupt legislators have sought to maximize their influence
by seeking committee assignments in areas of greatest interest to
them: the regulation of markets and the legal controls over organized crime. Through their roles on committees and in public fora,
they have managed to weaken the effectiveness of proposed legislation. Officials and legislators with ties to organized crime have
impeded the introduction of legislation that might circumscribe organized crime activity. The legislative framework needed to combat organized crime, including banking laws, insurance laws,
securities regulation, a RICO statute, laws against money laundering and a witness protection program, has yet to be adopted.
For example, members of the Duma complained in July 1994 that
their proposed law on corruption had its provisions concerning
corruption in banking deleted at the presidential level." Furthermore, in hearings before the Federation Council, legislators
with questionable financial holdings used highly suspect arguments to prevent consideration of the corruption law.' Many of
the legal measures under consideration in Russia have already
been adopted in several Eastern European countries.
The impact of corrupt legislators is particularly important at
this crucial stage where legislation that will govern the country in
subsequent decades is now being implemented. Once the basic
framework is enacted, vested bureaucratic and financial interests
combined with inertia will make it difficult to implement fundamental change.

42. Danilkin, supra note 22, at 6; Interviews with legislators and informed observers in CIS states (1994).
43. Charles Hecker and Pyotr Yudin, Deputy's Murder Shakes Duma, MOScOW
TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, at 14.

44. Interviews with members of the Committee on State Security, in Moscow,
Russia (July 1994).
45. Danilkin, supra note 22, at 6.
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The organized crime-political nexus is poised for future
growth because it has the resources to fund candidates in forthcoming elections at the local and national levels. The legislative
system, which grants immunity to members of parliament, provides an additional incentive for organized criminals to penetrate
the political process. Illustrative of this is the case of the infamous
Mavrodi, the head of the MMM pyramid stock fund that collapsed.
Following the loss of its assets in which millions of citizens were
deprived of their life savings, he was elected to the Duma in an
interim election. This has forestalled investigation of his misconduct by internal affairs bodies.46
There are already strong indications that corrupt banks are
supporting candidates in different regions of the country. In the
absence of legal regulations concerning campaign funding, no
accountability exists concerning the source of funds for different
political parties. As banks acquire major shares in the mass media they will be able to influence the election of candidates by
choosing who has access to television air time.
3. Organized Crime and Regional Power
Organized crime is assisting in the rise of regional powers in
Russia. This is not the decentralization and federalism sought by
American promoters of democracy. Instead, it represents the rise
of local fiefdoms protected by armed bands loyal to local leaders
seeking political and economic controls over their regions. These
local leaders may enjoy more power than in the Soviet period
because they own, rather than control, property and the "law
enforcers" are employed by them rather than the state. In the
absence of a legal framework, citizens outside major urban centers
may have great trouble protecting themselves from the abuses of
organized crime.
According to one long term observer of organized crime, five
main criminal groups in Krasnoyarsk "control all the region's
banks and markets, ninty percent of the privately owned stores
and forty percent of state owned stores."47 As is typical of other
locales, the city is divided into eight zones of influence and no
manager is appointed without the permission of the party boss."
Those who resist, such as the manager of a department store, are
subject to a gangland execution.49 In this way, organized crime
control over the managerial elite resembles the nomenklatura

46. Mavrodi Holds News Conference, RFE/RL DAILY REP. Oct. 17, 1994, at 1.
47. Igor Gamayunov, Thieves-in-Law: Devils Dressed as Robin Hood, Moscow
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1995, at 9.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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system of Party appointments.
4. Organized Crime and Penetrationinto the State
Organized crime has penetrated both the bureaucratic structures of the state and the newly elected legislatures. In many
respects this penetration bears similarities to the corruption of the
Soviet period. However, an important difference exists. While in
the final years of the Soviet period, tens of thousands of individuals were expelled from the internal organs for corruption and
abuse of their positions, ° no such large scale disciplinary action
exists today.
In 1993, law enforcement organizations investigated 15,500
cases of corruption and abuse of public office. Among those investigated, forty-three percent were federal and regional officials,
twenty-five percent were law enforcement officers, including members of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, four percent were
from presidential and federal oversight bodies and two percent
were members of federal and regional legislatures.51
According to Duma Security Chairman Viktor Ilyukhin, criminals are increasingly penetrating state bodies.52 In reaction, the
All-Russian Association of Independent Professionals and the
Soldiers' Mothers group have set up an electoral association called
"Against Crime and Corruption."5 3 This electoral association
seeks to combat the problems of corruption in the judiciary, the
use of gangster methods over arbitration and the penetration of
the police by organized crime.54 To restore justice and the rule of
law, they seek to elect members to parliament who will enact fair
legislation in the commercial and tax arenas.55
5. The War in Chechnya
The Western press has not addressed the extent to which the
war in Chechnya has been justified in terms of the criminal activity of the Chechens. As presidential advisor Latsis said, "the real
problem of Chechnya was the criminal character of Dudayev's
regime. It was essential to combat Chechnya's criminal elements."56 As Solzhenitsyn pointed out in an interview on
Chechnya, the criminal activity of the Chechens and their central

50. See Louise I. Shelley,

POLICING

SOVIET SOCIETY (forthcoming 1995).

51. Hearings on Corruption and Bureaucracy, RFE/RL DAILY REP., Nov. 17,

1994, at 1.
52. Crime Roundup, supra note 39, at No. 55, Part 1.
53. Professional and Soldiers' Mothers to Form Anti-Crime Bloc, RFE/RL DAILY

REP., Nov. 23, 1994, at 1.
54. Id.
55. Id.

56. Latsis, supra note 3, at 8.
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role in the shadow economy dates back fifteen years."
This war has led to massive violations of human rights"
and international conventions,59 gross misinformation carried in
the mass media, censorship and deception of fighting personnel.6 ° This war, fought in the name of organized crime, has
struck a major blow to important elements of the democratic process by undermining governmental accountability and strengthening the hand of the most repressive elements of the state. Because
the war is still underway, it is premature to assess its full impact
on the development of the rule of law.
There are strong democratic tendencies in the society, in the
military, and in the press that have opposed the war. At least four
generals refused to carry out orders to fire on civilians.6" Journalists and some television stations have taken a very strong
stance against the methods used in the war and the governmental
deception of the public." Furthermore, public opinion polls revealed that citizens did not view criminal activity as sufficient
justification for military action.6" Therefore, while the war has
eroded the rule of law, it has not suppressed all signs of democracy.
E. Organized Crime and Civil Society

The establishment of institutions independent of the state is
a fundamental prerequisite to the creation of civil society. Organized crime is impeding the development of civil society. Its presence is seen in sports clubs and charities. However, the greatest
concern is the impact of organized crime on the mass media.
The assassination of the highly popular Vladislav Listev, in
March 1995, has brought public attention to threats to members
of the press. Listev's death followed by several months the death
of Dmitri Kholodov who was investigating corruption in the western forces of the Russian military. Journalists are too intimidated

57. Solzhenitsyn o Chechne, 1-2 ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, 1, 1 (1995).
58. Since the early stages of the war, major atrocities have been committed.
Eg., Carlotta Gall, The Villager's Tale: Murder and Rape, Moscow TIMES, Jan. 11,
1995, at 1.
59. Polozheniiamezhdurnarodnogoprava, kotorye mogut byt'primeneny k konfliktu v Chechne, KOMMERSANT, Jan. 10, 1995, at 1; Igor Petrukhin, The Chechen
War is Unlawful, Moscow NEWS, Jan. 13, 1995, at 3.
60. Komandir Batal'ona morskoi pekhoty Tikhhookeanskogo flota otkazalsia
otpravliat' 'neobstreliannykh'soldat v Chechniu, IZVESTIIA, Jan. 14, 1995, at 2.
The deception of an OMON battalion from Ekaterinburg was reported in the
mass media and in an interview with Valerii Inozemstev, the head of the independent police union of Ekaterinburg (June 7, 1995).
61. Latsis, supra note 3, at 8.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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to write stories implicating businesses or individuals involved in
organized crime. 64 Bribes are offered to journalists not to publish
specific stories.6 5 Articles on organized crime may be purposely
inaccurate because organized crime figures plant stories against
their rivals or purposely mislead the public.6 6
An even greater potential threat to the freedom of the press
is the acquisition of the mass media by groups and organizations
with known organized crime links. For example, MOST owns
Segodnia newspaper and has established MTV television. 7
While Segodnia and MTV are two of the most independent and
hard-hitting members of the mass media, many analysts wonder
whether their independence will eventually be undermined by
their owner. The banking sector, dominated by organized crime,
has also been able to enter into television through the privatization process. When Ostankino, the most widely viewed national
channel, was sold, forty-nine percent of its shares were acquired
by banks.
Following Listev's murder, the head of Ostankino, Aleksandr
Yakoklev, resigned acknowledging mass corruption at the television station. An initial explanation of the rationale for Listev's
murder was the intense competition for the advertising revenues
of the television channel.
The ability to report objectively and access to the mass media
for candidates will be important in determining the future political development of Russian society. It is premature to tell whether
the dominance of the corrupt banking sector over the mass media
will be used to influence the outcome of elections.
II. RESPONSE TO ORGANIZED CRIME
The former Soviet Union has neither the legal infrastructure
nor the law enforcement apparatus necessary to combat organized
crime. The centralized law enforcement apparatus of the Soviet
Union collapsed along with the state. The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. into numerous separate countries means that there are no
border controls, no legal norms common to all the successor states
and limited coordination among justice systems. Even without this
collapse, the success of legal measures would be restricted by the
close links between organized crime and the economic and political elites of the successor states. 68 The criminals who maintain

64. Interview with journalists writing on organized crime in Moscow (July 1994
& Jan. 1995).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Remnick, supra note 25, at 118.
68. Fred Hiatt, Political Elites Vie for Power in Russian Quasi-Democracy,
WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1995, at Al, 28.
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their ties from the Soviet period benefit from the lack of legal
regulations to launder their money both at home and abroad.
They also provide financial services to foreign criminal groups
within the CIS.
The transnational nature of post-Soviet organized crime
means that no individual country can launch an effective fight
against these groups. The penetration of organized crime into the
successor states and the pervasive corruption of members of the
law enforcement apparatus have immunized most post-Soviet
groups from the law enforcement controls of their home countries.
Moreover, many who might combat this activity are rendered
impotent through intimidation of law enforcement personnel and
targeted attacks on selective members of the procuracy and the
judiciary. Although legislation has been passed to enhance protection for justice personnel, the state has neither the resources
nor the will to ensure compliance with these laws.69 In Russia,
there are currently 1,000 vacancies in the judiciary, many of them
unfilled because members of organized crime groups intimidate
judges.7"
Successful efforts to control organized crime require a coordination of national resources with international law enforcement
efforts. A coordinated strategy at the national and international
level must be developed which involves countries in which postSoviet groups are operating. Legislation and law enforcement
efforts must be harmonized among the successor states and with
countries in Europe, North and South America and Asia. Such
efforts are only beginning and must be sustained before the economic and political penetration of the successor states is so complete as to derail the transition to democracy and a market economy.
An unusual consensus exists among different parts of the
citizenry and the professional legal community regarding the need
to find legal and democratic means to deal with the organized
crime problem. In the absence of an effort to inform policy makers
and the public on democratic alternatives to fight organized crime,
there is a real danger that the Russian authorities will feel compelled to resort to further authoritarian tactics that could undermine Russian democracy.
A. The Preconditionsfor a Broad Response to Organized Crime

There are many parallels between the conditions that prevailed in Western countries when criminal organizations emerged
and the conditions existing in Russian society today. For that

69. Newscast (Ostankino television broadcast, Mar. 1995).
70. Id.
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reason, the experience gained by Western democracies in their
fight against organized crime can be helpful in Russia. Italian
specialists on the rise of the mafia point to similarities. They
suggest the emergence of organized crime occurred in a period of
land redistribution, the rise of private property and entrepreneurship in a society without a legal consciousness or law enforcement
institutions capable of combatting the mafia.7 '
The struggle against organized crime in Italy in the last
fifteen years has been so successful because the following important factors:
1) An informed populace has finally emerged ready to fight the
issue;
2) A legal framework has been adopted that has made it possible
to fight organized crime;
3) A law enforcement apparatus exists which has the capabilities
to address the problems of organized crime at all levels;
4) An informed media has addressed the issue of organized crime
with sophistication and the advocacy of democratic approaches;
5) The development of significant literature has kept the citizenry
informed; and,
6) Law schools have taught students about the problems of organized crime as part of their curriculum.72
Before 1980 almost none of these preconditions existed. Moreover, these results occurred with a great deal of assistance from
the United States. This assistance included the establishment of
an Italian-American working group on organized crime. Moreover,
several of the top experts on Italian organized crime spent time in
the United States examining American research, laws and legal
strategies.
Many of the preconditions necessary for an effective fight
against organized crime currently exist in Russia. There is a concerned citizenry which is willing to take action, journalists and
academics who have the courage to write truthfully about organized crime and legislators who are willing to adopt laws. The
U.S. government is attempting to replicate its law enforcement
efforts by establishing working groups in the law enforcement
area with the Russian police. The United States is also providing
technical assistance in the development of a legal framework. But
while the preconditions for an anti-organized crime effort exist,
they have not yet been galvanized.

71. Frederico Varese, Is Sicily the Future of Russia? Protection & the Rise of the
Russian Mafia, 35 ARCHIVES EUR. SOC. 222, 224-25 (1994).
72. See generally, DIEGO GAMBE'1TA, THE SICILIAN MAFIA: THE BUSINESS OF
PRIVATE PROTECTION (1993).

73. Id.
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B. Repression of Organized Crime
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Security police bear
the prime responsibility for the fight against organized crime. 74
The Ministry of Internal Affairs has a special branch devoted to
the fight against organized crime and it employs over twenty
thousand individuals nationwide.75 Important police units exist
in Moscow and St. Petersburg but their activities are hampered
by political pressures. In addition, these units are not as well
equipped as the criminals they are fighting. Police demoralization
and corruption are constant problems in the fight against organized crime.
The security police, FSB, searching for a new mission in the
post-Soviet period, is attempting to assume a larger role in the
fight against organized crime. 76 Its activities in this area are
used as justification for enhancing FSB links across the CIS
states and expanding surveillance and undercover activities within Russia.
The most significant measure presently used by the Russian
state to combat organized crime is the previously mentioned June
decree issued by President Yeltsin." At the time of its adoption,
the June decree was strongly criticized by both the Duma78 and
the Russian Ombudsman for its violation of the Constitution. In
contrast, the head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, S.
Stepashin, commented on the decree, "I am in favor of79violating
the rights of the individual if that person is a criminal."
The decree, as one commentator pointed out, did not replace
existing legislation but gave the operational services greater ability to gather information. 0 The most strongly criticized provision
of the decree was that it allowed suspects to be detained for thrity
days81 in violation of the Constitution. There are other important
potential violations. Suspects can be detained without a prosecto-

74. V.S. Ovchinskii & S.S. Ovchinsii, Borb'a mafiei v Rossi, in Moscow: KODEKS, 50, 50-56 (1993).
75. Id.
76. CIS Secret Service Chiefs Meet, OMRI DAILY DIG., No. 52, Part I, Mar. 14,
1995; Russian, Georgian Intelligence Chiefs Sign Cooperative Agreement, OMRI
DAILY DIG., No. 52, Part I, Mar. 14, 1995; Waller, supra note 16, at 370.
77. Interview with V.S. Ovchinskii (May 1995).
78. 0 zashchite konstitutionnykh pray i svobod grazhdan pri osyshchestvlenii
mer po bor'be s prestupnost'iu,ROssIISKAIA GAZETA, July 7, 1994, at 1.
79. Prosecutor'sOffice Discusses Organized Crime, F.B.I.S. DAILY REP., June 27,
1994, at 22.
80. Nikolai V. Kachev & Alexander G. Pipiya, Crime and Human Rights in
Russia, 2 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA, 360, 360 (1994).
81. Provisions of Anticrime Edict Assessed, F.B.I.S. DAILY REP., June 27, 1994,
at 23-24.
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is warrant.8 2 Authorities may deny the right to bail. Defendants
cannot examine documents before the opening of a criminal
case. 3 Commercial and banking privacy may be voided for those
suspected of organized criminal activity. 4 Additionally, the regulations regarding searches give more power to law enforcement.8 5
According to the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, Kronid
Liubarsky, human rights have often been violated in the name of
the decree.88 A member of the Duma Committee on Security
found that in the initial months of the decree, the MVD reported
that only ten percent of the individuals detained under the decree
were bandits although bandits were the decree's primary focus. 7
C. Legislative Framework
The June decree remains in force because there has been no
alternative organized crime legislation. A new criminal code, a
law on organized crime and a new code of criminal procedure are
needed to effectively combat organized crime. Unfortunately, none
of these laws has been passed by both houses of parliament.
One of the greatest threats to the democratic transition is
that state authority may be augmented in the name of the struggle with organized crime. For example, the new law on the FSB
enhances the power to engage in surveillance without adequate
provisions for legal oversight.8 8 Once this law is passed by the
Federation Council, the FSB will have powers that were not envisaged when the Soviet period ended. Reformers thought that
there would be the possibility of dismantling the power of the
security police but these hopes were derailed, in part, by the organized crime threat.
The State Duma in mid-November adopted a draft law on the
struggle against organized crime.8 9 This comprehensive law,
which uses elements of American RICO and the corresponding
Italian law, has harsh penalties for perpetrators.9 0 The prime
concerns raised by the organized crime law adopted were: the
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Kachev & Pipiya, supra note 80, at 362-63.
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Id.
Kronid Liubarsky told of a professor who was searched on the grounds of

Moscow State University. Interview with Kronid Liubarsky, Head of the Moscow
Helsinki Group (July 1994). The decree was used as a pretext for the search. Id.
87. Interview with Deputy S. Boskholov, in Washington, D.C., (Aug. 1994).
88. Michael Waller, Report to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (forthcoming 1995).
89. Interviews with Duma Committee Members responsible for drafting the
-organized crime law (Jan. 1995); Interviews with Members of the Duma Committee
on State Security (May 1995).
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imprecise definition of criminal groups, the authorized detention
of suspects for thirty days, the ability of law enforcers to intervene
in the commercial activities of enterprises and bank structures
suspected of laundering money and the failure to specify penalties
for the unlawful activities of investigating bodies.91 Political expediency and the crime situation led to the bill's passage over
objections concerning its violations of legal norms.
The increasing popular sentiment against organized crime
clearly figured in the Duma's adoption of the bill. Its fate at the
Federation Council level is not clear. A bill on corruption, developed by many of the same individuals who drafted the law on
organized crime, was allegedly rejected for its legal shortcomings.
But the bill's provisions on economic disclosure threatened the
financial interests of many wealthy members of the Federation
Council.92
The criminal code that is presently under consideration does
not contain a corresponding provision on organized crime. Even
though the individuals drafting the different laws in the crime
area are in close personal contact, ideological differences as well
as questions of turf impede the necessary coordination. It remains
to be seen whether the legislature will reconcile the different laws
before they are implemented or adopt a criminal code without a
separate organized crime law.
Mobilization of public opinion throughout the country following the killing of the popular journalist, V. Listev, is leading to
pressure on legislatures at the regional level to introduce their
own organized crime laws.9" As centralized power is proving increasingly ineffective and regional authority is growing, different
regions are developing their own legal framework to respond to
the organized crime problem. Even in such hot-spots of organized
crime as Ekaterinburg, a law on organized crime is progressing
through the legislature. The crime issue will be at the top of the
political agenda in the new Russian elections in 1996.
CONCLUSION

Organized crime is a major threat to human rights and the
rule of law. The killings of journalists and politicians strike at the
very core of the democratic process. Yet the legal measures and
enhanced law enforcement powers advocated to suppress organized crime undermine the transition to a rule of law state and

91. Shortcomings of Draft Organized Crime Law, F.B.I.S. DAILY REP., Dec. 20,
1994, at 28-29. There was also discussion of the law at the meeting of the Russian
Criminological Society attended by the author in Moscow (Jan. 7, 1995).
92. Danilkin, supra note 22, at 6.
93. Interviews with legal personnel in Russia (Apr./May 1995).

1995]

Post-Soviet Organized Crime

845

legitimize a return to authoritarian rule.
State actions which have led to large scale violations of human rights have characteristically been executed in the name of
the fight against organized crime. Illustrative of this are the expulsion of 10,000 people in 1993 following the storming of the
Supreme Soviet, the attack on MOST bank and the War in Chechnya. The augmentation of the Ministry of Interior's power and of
the Security apparatus in the name of the fight with organized
crime suggests that more violations will follow.
Serious violations of human rights will continue to occur if
the newly adopted laws fail to safeguard citizens' rights and law
enforcement personnel fail to comply with the laws. It is imperative that Russians learn that American and Italian successes in
fighting organized crime have been achieved by working within a
democratic framework.

